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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLU
SION CLARIFICATION; 42 U.S.c. SECTION 6921(i): DID CONGRESS
INTEND TO EXCLUDE MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ASH FROM REGU
LATION As HAZARDOUS WASTE UNDER SUBTITLE C?
INTRODUCTION
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Actl ("RCRA")
was enacted to regulate daily management of hazardous and non
hazardous solid wastes, to protect human health and the environ
ment, and to conserve depleting energy resources through recov
ery.2 Under Subtitle C of RCRA, Congress authorized the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate regula
tions 3 subjecting hazardous wastes to a strict "cradle-to-grave
regulatory regime."4 The EPA's response to this congressional au
thorization, which left the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts in
conflict regarding the interpretation of RCRA's "Household
Waste" exemption, is the subject of this Note. 5
Pursuant to congressional authorization, the EPA excluded
municipal "household waste" from Subtitle C regulation. 6 This
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Resource Conservation
.and Recovery Act of 1976. RCRA has become the preferred acronym for the Solid
Waste Disposal Act. RCRA is, in reality, a set of amendments designed to augment
existing solid waste disposal legislation. See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA:
The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21
ENVTL. L. REp. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254 (May, 1991).
2. 42 U.S.c. § 6902 (1988).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6925 (1988).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
5. See infra notes 14-15.
6. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,120 (1980) (codified as amended at 40 CFR § 261.4(b)(1)
(1992». The regulation provides:
§ 261.4 Exclusions
(b) Solid wastes which are not hazardous wastes. The following solid wastes
are not hazardous wastes:
(1) Household waste, including household waste that has been collected,
transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g., refuse-derived fuel) or
reused. "Household waste" means any waste material (including garbage,
trash and sanitary wastes in septic tanks) derived from households (including
single and multiple residences, hotels and motels.)
[d.
149
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EPA exclusion classified "household waste" as waste that "has been
collected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered ... or
reused."7 The EPA regulations have never clearly expressed
whether municipal waste ash which collects at the bottom of an in
cinerator after incineration ("bottom ash") is excluded from Subti
tle C regulation as "household waste" or, if the ash exhibits
hazardous waste characteristics, whether the ash should be regu
lated as a hazardous waste. S In section 3001(i) of the 1984 RCRA
amendments,9 Congress clarified and expanded the "household
waste" exclusion without addressing whether waste ash was specifi
cally included as "household waste" or excluded as a hazardous
waste. The codification of section 3001(i) essentially provided that
a resource recovery facility which burned municipal solid waste was
excluded from the hazardous waste regulation requirements of
"treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing" hazardous
waste. 10
Following the RCRA amendments and because Congress did
not clarify a per se ash exclusion, the EPA issued several conflicting
interpretations of the "household waste" exclusion with respect to
the bottom ash produced as a result of the waste management in
7. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,120 (1980).
8. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,098 (1980). The EPA excluded ash in the preamble to its haz
ardous waste regulations stating: "[s]ince household waste is excluded in all phases of
its management, residues remaining after treatment (e.g., incineration ...) are not sub
ject to regulation as hazardous waste." Id. at 33,085 (Preamble). But see infra notes
58-63 and accompanying text for subsequent conflicting EPA positions on whether or
not to exclude ash from hazardous waste regulation.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988). This is the codified amendment to RCRA, origi
nally section 3001(i); see infra note 10 for the full text of the clarification.
10. The codification of section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C § 6921(i) provides:
Clarification of Household Waste Exclusion
A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass burning of mu
nicipal solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or
otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the purpose of regulation under this
subchapter, if 
(1) such facility 
(A) receives and burns only 
(i) household waste (from single and mUltiple dwellings, hotels,
motels, and other residential sources), and
(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not
contain hazardous waste identified or listed under this section, and
(B) does not accept hazardous waste ... , and
(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established contractual require
ments or other appropriate notification or inspection procedures to assure that
hazardous wastes are not received at or burned in such facility.
42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988).
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cineration process.!1 It remained unclear whether bottom ash
which exhibited hazardous waste characteristics should be regu
lated as a hazardous waste under the RCRA Subtitle C regulation
or whether Congress intended to exempt it from the category of
hazardous waste.
This confusion concerning classification of waste ash as hazard
ous or household waste crystallized in two recent circuit court
cases12 which construed RCRA section 3001(i). Both cases ad
dressed whether the clarification of the "household waste" exemp
tion did, in fact, clarify whether municipal bottom waste ash is
within the exemption.13
This Note contrasts the Second Circuit's holding in Environ
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. 14 and
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. City of Chicag0 15 in an attempt to determine whether Congress
intended to exempt municipal waste bottom ash from regulation as
a hazardous waste, despite its hazardous propensities. 16 Section I of
11. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,098, 33,099 (1980); see also supra note 5. But see infra notes
58-63 and accompanying text for conflicting EPA positions on whether or not to ex
clude ash from hazardous waste regulation.
12. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453
(1991); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419 (N.D.
III. 1989), rev'd, 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992), affd on
rem.,985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
13. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
14. 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Environmental Defense Fund will be
referred to as "EDF"].
15. 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991).
16. See Kathleen J. Rutt, Note, Regulating the Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste
Incinerator Ash: The Companion Cases of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Whee
labrator Technologies, Inc. and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 4
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 207 (1993) for thorough factual recitation of the cases and brief anal
ysis of these cases analogizing the ash problem to CERCLA problems of clean-up of
hazardous contamination. Ms. Rutt's Note concludes that the Seventh Circuit in Chi
cago reached the correct conclusion that ash was intended to be exempt from hazard
ous waste regulation in the circumstances of the case. This Note reaches the opposite
conclusion and bases its analysis on statutory construction principles rather than on
policy considerations. See also David C. Wartinbee, Ph.D., Comment, Incinerator Ash
May Not Be A Hazardous Waste, But The Story Doesn't End There!, 9 COOLEY L. REV.
115 (1992) which concludes that the debate over municipal incineration ash disposal
may be a waste of time because the penalties a polluter incurs as a result of CERCLA
liability include reclamation of any polluted area. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mur
tha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991). However, an argument still needs to be made for
any regulation that will prevent pollution in the first place. Clean-up costs thousands,
even millions of dollars, and it can take years to revitalize a polluted area. See, John
Holusha, Ruling on Ash May Increase Some Cities' Disposal Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 1991, at Dl; Solid Waste: Hazardous or Not Interest Groups Want Incinerator Ash
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this Note outlines the development of the "household waste" ex
emption within RCRA and its 1984 clarification amendment. Sec
tion II examines the Second Circuit's Wheelabrator case, which held
that municipal ash was exempt from hazardous waste regulation as
a household waste. Section III reviews the Seventh Circuit's deci
sion in Chicago, which held that municipal ash was within the pur
view of hazardous waste regulation. Section IV analyzes and
contrasts these holdings and analyzes the Supreme Court's views on
the use of legislative history in statutory constructionP Finally, this
Note concludes that the Wheelabrator court properly construed the
"household waste" exemption by interpreting the ambiguous statu
tory language of section 3001(i) within the parameters set by the
Supreme Court. 1S
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

RCRA Subtitles C and D

RCRA and the EPA regulations promulgated thereunder con
stitute a comprehensive scheme of environmental legislation. This
scheme· divides solid waste into two classes for disposal purposes
and classifies waste as either hazardous or non-hazardous. The first
step in classification is to determine whether a substance, in this
case waste ash, is considered a solid waste. 19 In 1980, the EPA
promulgated, pursuant to congressional authorization, several regu
lations which defined "solid waste" and "other waste material."
The EPA defined solid waste as any "garbage, refuse, sludge" or
any "other waste material" not otherwise exempted. 20 The EPA
clarified the phrase "other waste material" to be material that has
Legislation From Congress, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1650 (Jan. 26, 1990). Therefore, it is
imperative that municipal ash be determined hazardous or benign for purposes of dis
posal so that municipalities can either get on with the development of incineration as a
viable energy recovery source or abandon it. See also Bradley K. Groff, Note, Burned
If-We-Do, Burned-If-We-Don't: Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste Incinerator Ash
Under RCRA's Household Waste Exclusion, 27 GEO. L. REV. 555 (1993) for a discus
sion of the use of legislative history and policy issues in statutory construction of
RCRA's section 3001(i).
17. This Note does not analyze policy or argue that policy is irrelevant to the
general issue of whether the need for municipal incineration outweighs the need for
environmental protection in municipal incineration circumstances. See supra note 16
for references which discuss exclusion of bottom ash based on policy considerations; see
also infra note 130.
18. See supra note 1; see also infra notes 131-86.
19. 40 C.F.R. pt. 260, app. I (1992).
20. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,093 (1980).
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"served its originally intended use and sometimes is discarded. "21
Because of the continued confusion over when a material is some
times discarded, in 1985 the EPA ultimately promulgated a straight
forward definition of solid waste which provided that any
"abandoned, recycled" or "inherently waste-like" material is dis
carded material, regardless of the method of disposal. 22 Therefore,
because municipal ash must be discarded or abandoned as a last
step in the waste management process, it is disposed-of material
and subject to regulation as a solid waste. 23
Once a substance is found to be a solid waste, the next step in
regulation is to determine if the solid waste is hazardous. 24 Subtitle
C of RCRA strictly regulates hazardous solid wastes that are either
"listed" or "characteristic" wastes.25 This is a two-step process.
First, RCRA requires the EPA to "develop and promulgate criteria
for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing
hazardous waste .... "26 Second, the statute requires the EPA to
promulgate regulations based on the criteria identifying the waste
as "characteristic" or "listed" hazardous wastes. 27 "Characteristic"
21. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1981) (superseded by 50 Fed. Reg. 641 (January 4, 1985».
See infra note 22 for the text of the subsequent definition of "discarded material."
22. 50 Fed. Reg. 627 (1985). This regulation reiterated the statutory definition of
solid waste as any "discarded material not otherwise excluded by regulation or by a
variance." Id. Statutory regulations further define "discarded material" as that "aban
doned," "recycled" or "inherently waste-like." See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(i)-(iii) (1992).
Any "abandoned" material includes solid wastes "disposed of," "burned" or "inciner
ated" or "[a]ccumulated, stored, or treated ... before or in lieu of being abandoned."
See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i) and (b)(1)-(3) (1992).
23. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
American Mining, the question was whether the EPA definition of solid waste had im
properly subjected to regulation as a solid waste American Mining material which was
secondary, recovered material, captured and reinserted into the metal smelting process
as an ongoing part of production. Id. at 1179, 1181. The court held that the EPA ex
ceeded congressional intent to regulate "discarded material" in regulating secondary,
reused material. Id. at 1186. The EPA interpreted the holding narrowly and excluded
only those secondary materials that were recovered and reused. If any recycled mate
rial is discarded, i.e., disposed of, it is not excluded from solid waste regulation. 53 Fed.
Reg. 519-21, 523, 526 (1988). This ruling was subsequently validated by the court in
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
24. 40 C.F.R. pt. 260, app. I (1992). See Hilary A. Sale, Note, Trash, Ash and
Interpretation of RCRA, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 421-25 (1993) for a thorough
discussion of when ash is considered toxic and for some of the EDF's data that sup
ported its arguments that ash should be hazardous waste.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (Supp. IV 1992).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The criteria should be formulated "tak
ing into account toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumu
lation in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other
hazardous characteristics." Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (Supp. IV 1992). These regulations indicate characteristic
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wastes are those that meet an "inherent property" test as set forth
in EPA regulations. 28 These inherent property regulations provide
that if, after testing, a waste is either ignitable, reactive, corrosive or
toxic, it can be classified as a "characteristic" waste. 29 Most "char
acteristic" wastes are classified due to their toxicity. Consequently,
the EPA set forth a comprehensive detailed procedure for deter
mining if a waste has a toxic characteristic. 30
"Listed" hazardous wastes are those that may exhibit toxic, ig
nitable, corrosive or reactive characteristics or that are automati
cally considered hazardous for other reasons. 31 "Listed" hazardous
wastes are divided into four groups.32 These groups are spent
chemicals and by-products of various industrial processes,33 sludges
and by-products of an entire single industry,34 and two categories
including commercial chemicals and pesticides when discarded or
spilled. 35 EPA regulations establish the following three criteria to
determine whether wastes are "listed" hazardous wastes: (1) wastes
exhibiting one of the toxic characteristics of ignitablity, reactivity,
corrosiveness or toxicity;36 (2) wastes fatal in low doses;37 or (3)
wastes exhibiting RCRA properties posing "a substantial present
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when im
properly ... managed. "38
A waste is further classified as either a "characteristic" or
"listed" waste based on EPA "mixture and derived from" rules
wastes are those that meet an "inherent property" test in one of four ways: ignitability,
reactivity, corrosivity and toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1989). See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.c. § 6921(b) (Supp. IV 1992); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1992).
29. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1992).
30. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,987 (1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, app. II (1992)). A
non-liquid waste is subject to a leaching procedure which extracts toxic material from
the waste and tests its level of toxicity against established EPA guidelines. Id. If the
waste exceeds 100 times the maximum contaminant level set under the Safe Water
Drinking Act or other appropriate safety legislation for that material, it is considered
hazardous. See 42 U.S.C. § 30Of-3 (1988); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 33,111 (1980); 55 Fed.
Reg. 11,827 (1990).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (1992).
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.11.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 261.31 (1992); "f-listed," "nonspecific source" wastes of which
there are 39 as of 1992.
34. 40 C.F.R. § 261.32 (1992); "k-listed," "specific source" wastes of which there
are almost 100 listed.
35. 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (1992); "P" or "U" wastes which include over 250 products
or residues.
36. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(1) (1992); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20 -.24 (1992).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(2) (1992).
38. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(3) (1992).
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which address disposed of mixtures and the waste derived there
from.39 A material will be classified as hazardous if, although an
essentially non-hazardous "mixture" upon disposal, the residue
"derived" from the "mixture" after disposal exhibits hazardous
characteristics. 40 The residue remains a hazardous waste as long as
it exhibits the hazardous characteristic. 41
A major problem in characterizing or listing municipal ash as a
hazardous waste arises from the nature of the ash itself. Although
municipal wastes are themselves non-hazardous, once incinerated
they may produce a toxic ash and would intermittently fail EPA
toxicity tests.42 A facility may take in essentially the same non-haz
ardous household wastes time and time again and never know
which residue, if any, will test above the EPA toxicity limits.
If a facility is classified as a hazardous waste disposal facility by
the EPA, the only way a material disposed of by the facility escapes
Subtitle C regulation is if the facility petitions the EPA for "delist
ing" and shows the EPA that the material being disposed of is not,
in fact, hazardous. 43 Facilities seeking delisting must establish that
(1) wastes do not fall within the "characteristic" classification, and
(2) wastes do not exhibit any other characteristic that would cause
the EPA to keep them "listed."44 In general, only materials with
hazardous propensities below EPA testing levels are "delisted."
Notwithstanding this delisting procedure, the EPA has "declas
sified" certain solid wastes from Subtitle C regulation. 45 These
wastes are "declassified" despite their hazardous characteristics
which place them over the EPA testing limits and otherwise would
require regulation under RCRA Subtitle C. One important exc1u
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii-iv) (1992). Although a "mixture and derived
from" rule is not specifically stated in the regulation, the EPA discussed the rule in the
preamble to the 1980 regulations. See infra note 58.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2) (1992).
41. Id.
42. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (app. II) (1992). The EPA toxicity test is a measure of
the hazardous characteristics of a given solid waste. See AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp.
v. EPA, 846 F.2d 158, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (stating waste is subject to
regulation as hazardous waste where it fails the EPA toxicity test).
43. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22 (1992).
44. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22(a)(1)-(2) (1992). See also supra notes 28-38 for other EPA
regulations pertaining to the discussion on classifying waste as "characteristic" or
"listed." The next step in testing requires the material to be subjected to the vertical
and horizontal model of groundwater transport to determine if the material will be
problematic. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,896 (1985). The material is tested for the amount of dilu
tion and attenuation that will occur after disposal in an unlined landfill. Id.
45. 40 C.F.R. § 261 (app. IX) (1992).

156

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:149

sion from regulation under Subtitle C exempts "household wastes,"
or municipal waste being burned in energy recovery facilities. 46 Be
cause Congress indicated that incineration would cease to develop
as a viable energy recovery method if municipalities' "household
wastes" were subject to the strict Subtitle C regime, the EPA fur
ther declassified certain hazardous solid wastes. 47 Consequently,
"household waste" is currently regulated under the less stringent
standards of Subtitle D of RCRA.48
B.

The "Household Waste" Exclusion 49

The EPA issued Subtitle C regulations in three phases. 5o Sec
tion 261.4 of the May 1980 regulations provided that "household
wastes," unless mixed with other hazardous wastes, would be
deemed non-hazardous wastes. 51 "Household waste" means "any
waste material (including garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in sep
tic tanks) derived from households."52 The preamble to the 1980
regulations stated that "household waste," as a waste stream, was
excluded in all phases of its management. Thus, residue remaining
after incineration, because it is a part of the overall management
process, is part of the waste stream and part of the exclusion.53
In 1984, Congress clarified the "household waste" exclusion in
section 3001(i}.54 Congress made general reference to "household
46. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
47. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 6901-6902 (Supp. IV 1992).
48. 42 U.S.c. § 6941-6949a (1988). See supra note 6. Subtitle D's less stringent
standards merely forbid disposing of solid wastes in open dumps and have not been the
focus of any significant EPA regulations since the 1976 passage of RCRA. In 1989, as
part of clean air legislation and RCRA reauthorization, reports recommended specific
ash regulations, but these recommendations were not incorporated into legislation. See
Ash Management and Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 306,104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
For a further discussion of Subtitle D which focusses on recycling and operation of state
landfills, see Sale, supra note 24, at 414.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988).
50. See Illinois v. Costle, 9 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,243 (D.D.C. 1979),
affd sub nom. Citizens For a Better Env't. v. Costle, 617 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 42
U.S.c. § 6972(a)(1) (1988). The EPA then issued Subtitle C regulations in three phases:
45 Fed. Reg. 12,722 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066-259 (1980); and 47 Fed. Reg. 32,274
(1982). See also 47 Fed. Reg. 32,276-277 (1982) (listing all initial Subtitle C regulation's
published dates).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992). See supra note 6 for the text ofthe regulation.
52. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992). See supra note 6 for the text of the "house
hold waste" exclusion.
53. Id. The EPA further explained that if household waste was mixed with haz
ardous wastes, the mixture would be "deemed hazardous" and would be regulated
under Subtitle C. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988). See supra note 10 for the text of the clarification.
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wastes," without specifically addressing municipal ash regulation.55
In 1985 the EPA promulgated a regulation identical to the language
of section 3001(i).56 The preamble to that EPA regulation acknowl
edges the existence of toxic ash and interprets the "household
wastes" statute to exclude municipal ash only where toxic charac
teristics are rarely found in ash residue. 57 This left open the possi
ble inclusion of toxic ash as a Subtitle C waste. This possible
interpretation conflicted with the EPA's earlier interpretation that
ash as part of the waste stream is a household waste and therefore
exempt from regulation as a hazardous waste. 58 However, the EPA
further announced its intention not to consider the matter until seri
ous questions arose about the ash. The EPA's position apparently
stemmed from concern for the "highly beneficial nature of resource
recovery facilities" as expressed by Congress in its RCRA state
ment of purposes. 59
In 1987, the EPA appeared to be changing its position. The
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emer
gency Response, J. Winston Porter, testified before the Senate Sub
committee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substances. 6o In
response to a question on the status of incinerator ash, Porter con
ceded that the EPA "may have been in error."61 Porter testified
that the EPA interpretation of the household waste clarification
was that Congress "probably intended to exclude these residues
55. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. 40 c.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992); 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (1985). See supra note
10 for the text of § 3001(i) clarification of the "household waste" exclusion.
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (1985).
58. Id. The preamble states:
The statute is silent as to whether hazardous residues from burning combined
household and non-household waste are hazardous waste. These residues
would be hazardous wastes under present EPA regulations if they exhibited a
characteristic. The legislative history does not directly address this question
although the Senate report can be read as enunciating a general policy of non
regulation of these resource recovery facilities if they carefully scrutinize their
incoming wastes. On the other hand, residues from burning could, in theory,
exhibit a characteristic of hazardous waste even if no hazardous waste is
burned . . . . EPA does not see ... an intent to exempt the regulation of
incinerator ash from the burning of non-hazardous waste in resource recovery
facilities if the ash routinely exhibits a characteristic of hazardous waste.
Id.
59. Id. at 28,726.
60. Regulations of Municipal Solid Waste Incinerators: Hearings on H.R. 2162
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Thomas A. Luken, Chairman).
61. Id.
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from regulation under Subtitle C."62
Only months later, the EPA appeared again to reverse itself.
In May of 1988, Sylvia Lowrance, Director of the EPA Office of
Solid Waste, testified before the same Senate Subcommittee and
restated the EPA's 1985 position that if ash exhibits hazardous char
acteristics, it would be regulated as hazardous waste. 63 .
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments imposed a two year
moratorium on municipal solid waste incineration ash regulation. 64
Despite the existence of a proposed bill which would have specifi
cally regulated ash under Subtitle D of RCRA, Congress expressly
put the ash regulation problem on hold until it reauthorized RCRA
during the 102nd Congress, a step it has yet to take. 65 However,
Congress also expressly stated that the moratorium would not "af
fect in any manner ongoing litigation," including the two cases con
trasted in this Note. 66
.
62. S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1983). Porter concluded that the
primary intent of § 3001(i) was to encourage energy recovery and that the EPA's previ
ous interpretation would be inconsistent with the exclusion where Congress had ex
pressly stated "all waste management activities of a facility" were to be included. Id.
63. Id. at 33.
64. Pub. L. No. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399 (1990). Congress decided to maintain the
status quo on ash regulation despite the existence of a proposed bill which would have
specifically regulated ash under Subtitle D of RCRA. Representative Thomas A.
Luken, in his opening remarks at the hearing on the proposed legislation, recognized
the ambiguity of the current statutory language as to whether Subtitle C or D should
regulate ash. Hearings, supra note 60. Representative Luken further recognized the
conflicting signals sent by the EPA and called for legislative action. Id. Although it is
not entirely clear why Congress did not act on this bill, it could be argued that Congress
was awaiting judicial decision on the two cases contrasted in this Note. Judicial resolu
tion of any dispute between the circuits could focus the scope of further legislation.
Should the Supreme Court take a position inconsistent with congressional intent, then
Congress would act to make the language of the "household waste" exemption clearer.
If Congress is satisfied with the outcome, it need not act further.
65. See Stephen Johnson, Recyclable Materials and RCRA's Complicated, Con
flicting, and Costly Definition of Solid Waste, 21 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,357,
10,358 n.10 (July, 1991). In the first three weeks of the first session of the 102nd Con
gress, over 11 amendments or reauthorization bills were introduced. Id. See also supra
note 64.
66. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931
F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 448 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 486
(1992), affd on rem., 985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). Both
Wheelabrator and Chicago appeals were pending at the time of the 1990 Clean Air
Amendments. The House and Senate Conferees expressly stated: "[t]he Conferees do
not intend to prejudice or affect in any manner ongoing litigation, including Environ
mental Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 758 (2d Cir.) [sic] and Envi
ronmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago, Appeal No. 90-3060 (7th Cir.) [sic] or any
state activity regarding ash." Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213 (quoting H.R. CONF. No.
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ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC V. WHEELABRATOR
TECHNOLOGIE~ INC 67

The defendant in Wheelabrator, Wheelabrator Technologies,
Inc. ("Wheelabrator"), operates a resource recovery facility which
produces ash residue as a result of incinerating the trash of West
chester County, New York. 68 Prior to the commencement of the
suit against Wheelabrator, nine out of ten bottom ash samples
taken from the incinerator failed the EPA toxicity test technically
rendering the samples hazardous materia1. 69 The Environmental
Defense Fund ("EDF") contended that this ash was hazardous
waste subject to RCRA Subtitle c. 70 Wheelabrator contended that
the ash fell within RCRA's "household waste" exclusion and there
fore could be disposed of via non-hazardous Subtitle D
regulation. 71
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York rejected EDF's arguments, issued a memorandum of
findings and conclusions and ordered further discovery. The dis
trict court ultimately ordered judgment for Wheelabrator, exempt
ing its ash from Subtitle C regulation. 72 The EDF appealed the
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis
trict court's holding. 73 The court of appeals found that Congress
intended Wheelabrator's municipal ash residue to be excluded from
hazardous waste regulation because ash was intended to be "house
hold waste" as clarified under section 3001(i) of the 1984 amend
ments to RCRA.7 4
952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 335, 342, reprinted in 1990 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3874); see
supra note 64.
67. 725 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 453 (1991).
68. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 212.
69. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 761 n.6. The procedure used to test these sam
ples is set out at Appendix II to 40 C.F.R. § 261.33. See also supra note 42 and accom
panying text.
70. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 212. See also 42 U.S.c. §§ 6921-6939b (1988).
71. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 212. See also supra notes 6, 9 and 48.
72. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213. The district court further dismissed EDF's
complaint with prejudice which led to the appeal based on the findings and conclusions
of the court's memorandum of November 21, 1989. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 770.
73. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213-14. The Second Circuit stated: "[a]fter care
fully reviewing Judge Haight's thorough and well reasoned opinion, we agree with his
analysis of the legal issues. Accordingly, we affirm." [d.
74. [d. at 213.
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The court of appeals relied on the district court's reasoning in
its opinion. The district court considered the substantive issues re
lating to the creation and management of municipal ash residue as
set out in RCRA section 3001(i).7s The court held that the section
3001(i) exclusion extends to "residue ash produced by the incinera
tion of municipal solid waste."76
The district court read the language of the statute in light of its
legislative history.77 The court construed the plain language of sec
tion 3001(i) using the statute's definitions of "disposal," "hazardous
waste generation" and "hazardous waste management."78 The term
"disposal" is defined by the statute as "discharge, deposit, injection
... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any
land or water so that such ... waste ... may enter the environment
or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters ...."79
"Hazardous waste generation" means "the act or process of pro
ducing hazardous waste."80 "Hazardous waste management"
means "the systematic control of the collection, source separation,
storage, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery and dispo
sal of hazardous wastes. "81
EDF argued that "managing" rather than "generating" hazard
ous wastes was the focus of section 3001(i), rendering "generating"
of the ash outside the purview of the exclusion. 82 The court dis
agreed. The court read the term "management" with the term "dis
posal" to conclude that managing waste is not exclusive of
generating waste because in managing waste, a facility must dispose
of any residue that is generated. 83
The legislative history of section 3001(i) persuaded the district
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 758, 764-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
453 (1991).
78. [d. at 764; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3), (6), (7) (1988). See infra notes 79-81
and accompanying text for the definitions of the statutory terms relied on by the Second
Circuit.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988); Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 n.13.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(6) (1988); Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 n.13.
8!. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(7) (1988); Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 n.13.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988); see supra note 10.
83. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 765 (quoting S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 61 (1983), adopted by H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1133, 98th Congo 1st Sess. 79, 106
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5677). The Report stated that all waste
management activities were within the purview of the exclusion including: "generation,
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of waste ...." S. REP. No. 284 at 61.
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court of the intended exemption. The court quoted extensively
from a Senate committee report,84 a conference committee report,85
and EPA statements. 86 The Wheelabrator court also quoted from
post-legislative letters written by senators and a representative87
which interpreted that Congress did not intend to exempt ash with
toxic characteristics from regulation as a hazardous waste. The
court concluded, however, that subsequent interpretations of legis
lation are not useful in determining congressional intent. 88 . Con
gress' intent at the time it passed section 3001(i), as indicated in
Senate and Committee reports, was to encourage energy recovery.
Therefore, the reach of the exclusion must include the facilities that
recover energy.89
The district court supported its analysis with the Report of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works ("Report")
which accompanied the proposed amendment. 90 The Report indi
cated to the court that since section 3001(i) was a clarification of an
EPA regulation, Congress was aware of the EPA interpretation
which included ash in the exemption. 91 Congress could have specif
ically clarified the EPA interpretation with regard to ash. The court
concluded it would be an unfair reading of the statute to omit ash
from the "household waste" exclusion without a clearer indication
from Congress to do SO.92
. The Report also included the term "generation" in its explana
tion of the exclusion, although RCRA itself does not. 93 Given the
fact that the legislation is ambiguous on its face, the court found the
Report's reference to generation probative of whether Congress in
tended to include generation of waste, such as ash residue, within
84. S. REp. No. 284, supra note 62, at 61. See infra notes 90-94 and accompany
ing text for the substance of the Senate Report.
85. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 765 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1133, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 106 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5677).
86. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 766-69; see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying
text.
87. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 769-70. EDF submitted letters of October,
1987, from senators and a representative in support of its argument. The court dis
agreed because the letters were written subsequent to the legislation and were "not
even the contemporaneous views of the authors, much less of Congress as a whole." Id.
at 770; see also infra note 113 and accompanying text.
88. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 769.
89. [d. at 767.
90. [d. at 765 (quoting S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1983)); see supra
note 83.
91. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764-65.
92. [d. at 765-66.
93. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 62, at 61.
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the "household waste" exemption.94
The district court gave little deference to the EPA state
ments,95 regarding them as inconsistent and based on a question
able interpretation of the statute. The court accorded even less
weight to the letters submitted by the senators and Representative
Florio on EDF's behalf. In addition, the court found subsequent
interpretations by some members of Congress" 'hazardous' to the
present purpose of statutory construction."96 The court concluded
that the intent of Congress was clear at the time of the exclusion's
passage. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with
the district court that Congress intended to exempt municipal incin
eration ash from Subtitle C regulation in order to promote the en
ergy recovery process itself.97

III.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC V. CITY OF
CHICAG098

The Northwest Waste-to-Energy Facility, owned and operated
by the City of Chicago, has incinerated residential refuse since 1971.
The incineration process, in turn, produces bottom ash residue. 99
Between 1981 and 1987, thirty-five ash samples from the facility
were tested for toxicity. Thirty-two of the samples exceeded toxic
ity limits as set forth in Subtitle C and EPA regulations. loo In Chi
cago, the EDF brought suit against the city of Chicago for RCRA
violations. Chicago conceded that its incinerator's ash was "man
aged" as non-hazardous waste,lOl but argued that such management
was appropriate because the ash, even if it exhibited hazardous
characteristics, was exempt under section 3001(i) of RCRA102 and
thus subject only to Subtitle D regulation. The EDF contended
that the City of Chicago violated RCRA by Chicago's disposal of
hazardous waste in a non-hazardous Michigan landfill. 103 The par
Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 765.
95. Id. at 766-69. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for the EPA's
interpretations of the "household waste" exemption.
96. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 770; see supra note 87.
97. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931
F.2d 211, 213-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). The court also found the
New York state exclusion consistent with § 3001(i) by the same reasoning. Id.
98. 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992), affd, 985 F.2d 303
(7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
99. Id. at 345-46.
100. Id. at 346; see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
101. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 345-46.
102. 42 V.S.c. § 6921(i} (1988); see supra note 10 for the text of the exemption.
103. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 346.
94.
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ties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court
issued a memorandum finding Chicago exempt from Subtitle C reg
ulation pursuant to the section 3001(i) exclusion. 104 However, the
court denied both motions and ordered further discovery to deter~
mine if Chicago was in compliance with section 3001(i). EDF con
ceded that Chicago was in compliance and Chicago renewed its
motion for summary judgment which was granted on August 20,
1990. EDF appealed the granting of summary judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. lOs
The Seventh Circuit held that municipal solid waste ash was
subject to Subtitle C regulation as a hazardous waste. The court
explained that ash which was generated as a result of household
waste management was subject to Subtitle C regulation if it exhib
ited hazardous characteristics as defined in EPA regulations. 106
The Chicago court set out the legislative history of section
3001(i)107 and then chose not to rely on it, basing its opinion on the
plain language of the statute. lOS The Seventh Circuit found that the
"definitive statement of the congressional intent" lies in the actual
words of the statute which it considered the "end product of the
rough-and-tumble of the political process."l09 After setting out the
language, purpose, and background of the statute, the court ex
plained that "[w]hat we have to work with here is a statute subject
to varying interpretations, a foggy legislative history, and a waffling
104. Id.
lOS. Id.
106. Id. at 3S2.
107. The Chicago and Wheelabrator courts examined the same legislative history,
which is also set out in the background of RCRA in Section I of this Note. See also
supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
108. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 3SO-S1. The Chicago court quoted Supreme Court Jus
tice Antonin Scalia in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989). Justice Scalia
wrote that use of legislative history:
is neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, con
sistent and effective application of the statutes of the United States, nor con
ducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative
force to each snippet of analysis ... in committee reports that are increasingly
unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually had in
mind.
Id.
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Sinclair, also spoke of the use of legislative history in
construing statutes as "a poor guide to legislators' intent because it is written by the
staff rather than by members of Congress, because it is often losers' history ... , be
cause it becomes a crutch ... , because it complicates the task of execution and obedi
ence." In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
109. Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1343.
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administrative agency."110
The Seventh Circuit focused on the language of section 3001(i)
which provides that "[a] resource recovery facility recovering en
ergy from the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not be
deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing
hazardous wastes for the purpose of regulation under this sub
chapter."lll The court acknowledged that because of the statute's
ambiguity, legislative history may be probative of congressional in
tent. However, in this case, the court found that the legislative his
tory itself was not "explicit" as to Congress' intent to exempt ash.
On this point the Chicago court expressly disagreed with the Whee
labrator court. 1l2
In support of its position, the Seventh Circuit relied on the
post-enactment letter signed by Senators Stafford, Ourenberger,
Chafee, Burdick, Baucus, Mitchell, and the letter of Representative
Florio which implied that members of Congress intended manage
ment and not generation of waste to be the focus of the exemp
tion. 113 The court also relied on Congressman Thomas Luken's
opening remarks at a 1989 hearing on proposed legislation to regu
late ash under Subtitle D.114 Congressman Luken indicated in his
opening statement that Congress did not intend to exempt ash from
toxicity analysis or from regulation under Subtitle C if the ash
tested at hazardous, toxic levels.11 5 The Seventh Circuit considered
this as further evidence that the Senate Report, relied on by the
Second Circuit in Wheelabrator, was not as definitive as that court
deemed it to be. 1l6 The Seventh Circuit concluded that generation
and management are not coextensive terms.1l7
110.. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 350.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 10 for the full
text of the clarification.
112. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 348. The two sentence dissent of Judge Ripple states
that he would affirm the district court's decision for the reasons stated in Wheelabrator.
Id. at 352 (Ripple, J., dissenting). See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for the
opposite holding of the Wheelabrator court.
113. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 348. The Senators' letter is reproduced in the opinion
and indicates that Congress did not intend to exempt the ash from analysis for toxicity.
Therefore, Congress must have intended that if the ash tested hazardous that it should
be regulated under RCRA Subtitle C. Id.
114. Hearings, supra note 60; see supra note 64 for a discussion of the content of
the hearings.
115. Hearings, supra note 60; see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
116. Hearings, supra note 60.
117. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 351. The court explained that "[s]tatutory construction
is a holistic endeavor: the only permissible meaning is that which is compatible with the
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In analyzing the statutory language, the court focused on the
phrase "or otherwise managing" and the fact that the other terms as
defined in the statute do not include the concept of "generating" a
different waste product altogether. 118 The court found the "or
otherwise managing" language of section 3001(i) to be the disposi
tive language of the statute. According to the court, "[o]r otherwise
managing" indicated that "generating" a different waste was not
within the exclusion. 119 The court found the words of the statute to
be specific in that "management" includes only those specific activi
ties that are listed. 120 The statute defines "management" using the
terms "treatment" and "disposal." Neither definition incorporates
the term "generation."121 Therefore the court held that "manage
ment" does not include "generation," that the section 3001(i) exclu
sion does not apply, and that municipal solid waste ash is subject to
regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA.122 The court concluded that
the bottom ash waste product is different waste product because it
has a completely different chemical and physical composition from
the trash that began the process.123 The court found it inconsistent
that the generation of hundreds of tons of hazardous wastes that
qualify as "characteristic" wastes were intended to be excluded
from Subtitle C regulation when a stated purpose of RCRA is to
encourage the careful management of hazardous materials which
are dangerous to human health.124

a

'flesh and bones' of a law, from its overarching purpose down to its individual words."
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 351; see supra note 10 for the full text of the exclusion.
120. See 42 U.S.c. § 6903(3), (6) and (7) (1988); see supra note 78.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). The term "gen
eration" is separately defined as "the act or process of producing hazardous waste." 42
U.S.c. § 6903(6) (1988). The term "treatment" is defined as:
any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to
change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any
hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
non-hazardous, safer for transport, amendable for recovery ... , storage, or
reduced in volume. Such term includes any activity or processing designed to
change the physical form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as to
render it non-hazardous.
42 U.S.c. § 6903(34) (1988). See also supra note 79 for the definition of "disposal."
122. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352.
123. Id. at 351.
124. Id.; see supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit echoes
concern over the world-wide struggle with the dangers of illegal hazardous waste trade.
The continued increase in volume of generated waste combined with a decrease in land
fill space in developed nations like the United States will only exacerbate the problem
especially for developing nations where proper disposal methods do not exist and
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 16,
1992.125 In a Summary Disposition, the Court vacated the Seventh
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration
in light of a September 28, 1992 EPA memorandum, once again in
terpreting the "household waste" exemption. In the memorandum,
the EPA stated that its regulations intended to exempt ash from
regulation as a hazardous waste. 126 On January 29, 1993, the Sev
enth Circuit reconsidered the case on remand from the Supreme
Court.127 The court affirmed its previous holding and held that
"ash generated in the combustion of municipal waste is subject to
the regulatory scheme governing hazardous waste set forth in
[RCRA]," notwithstanding the EPA's conflicting interpretation. 128
Therefore, the Second and Seventh Circuits were still in
disagreement.
On June 21, 1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 129
Arguments were heard on January 19, 1994. 130
where excess waste from developed nations generally ends up. See C. Russell H.
Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on Hazardous
Waste, 23 ENVTL L. 141 (1993). Therefore, it seems logically imperative that the United
States determine what it will or will not consider hazardous waste for disposal purposes.
Any non-hazardous waste that can be safely disposed of on United States soil can also
alleviate the amount of waste that may be criminally shipped out of the country in an
effort to circumvent proper disposal methods for hazardous waste.
125. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992).
126. Memorandum of William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, dated September 18, 1992, 61 U.S.L.W. 3369 (November 17, 1992). At the
suggestion of the Bush administration, the Court sidestepped the question of whether
municipal waste ash should be regulated as a hazardous waste, and sent the case back to
the Seventh Circuit. The outcome was uncertain because the Seventh Circuit had
warned the Supreme Court that it was not likely to change its position on EPA defer
ence and had asked the Supreme Court for full review of the case. Supreme Court
Remands Major Waste Disposal Case, UPI, November 16, 1992, available in LEXIS
News Library, UPI file.
127. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 985 F.2d 303 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
128. Id.
129. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
130. 62 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1993) (No. 19-1639); see also Hazardous
Waste: U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Review RCRA Application to City Incinerator
Ash, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 22, 1993, at A118. Whether the
Clinton administration's change in EPA leadership will have any effect on the Supreme
Court's analysis remains to be seen. The new EPA head Carol Browner was the former
secretary of Florida's DEP and an attorney. She has received high praise from environ
mental groups for her "aggressive, proactive approach to regulation and her vigorous
enforcement of the law." During confirmation hearings, Browner stated that the "EPA
can ease the burden on the business community without compromising the environ
ment." Theodore L. Garrett, The Changing Environmental Guard at EPA: What to
Expect, SONREEL NEWS, May-June 1993, at 2.
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ANALYSIS

The disagreement in statutory construction that has arisen be
tween the Second and Seventh Circuits over the interpretation of
an environmental statute is not unique. Courts have long struggled
with the use of legislative history in statutory construction. Re
cently, the pre-World War Two textualist philosophies have re
emerged, creating renewed vigor in the oldest of controversies con
cerning the benefits and drawbacks of using legislative history in
statutory construction. The Wheelabrator and the Chicago courts
reached opposite holdings due to the method chosen to construe
the statute. 131 The Wheelabrator court, finding the statutory lan
guage ambiguous, utilized what it thought to be the most authorita
tive legislative history, rejected what it thought to be the least
authoritative history and held that the municipal bottom ash was
part of the "household waste" exemption. 132 The Chicago court's
analysis included consideration of non-authoritative post-legislative
history. The post-legislative history the court considered was at
odds with the pre-legislative history. As a result, the Seventh Cir
cuit rejected all the legislative history as confusing and ultimately
resorted to the textual or literal approach to statutory construc
tion.133 The Chicago court then held that the municipal bottom ash
that is toxic should be regulated as a hazardous waste.134
The Second and Seventh Circuits' decisions represent two dis
tinct approaches to statutory construction. The Wheelabrator
court's approach used authoritative legislative history to glean con
gressional intent.135 The Chicago court used a "plain meaning" ap
131. The basic canons of statutory construction are: 1. Plain language; 2. Give
effect to the entire statute; 3. Read the text in its contemporary context; 4. If ambiguity
exists, look to legislative history; and 5. Provide a reasonable interpretation avoiding
absurd results. For a thoroughly enjoyable analysis of these basic concepts, see Justice
John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1373 (1992).
132. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931
F.2d 211, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); see supra notes 74-97.
133. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352; see supra notes 107-24.
134. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352. The Chicago court, while textually construing the
statute, also looked at statistics which indicated that hundreds of tons of ash were pro
duced annually by the incineration process. Id. As a matter of policy, the court con
cluded Congress could not have meant hundreds of tons of a chemically and physically
different composition than that which entered the incineator to be "household waste."
Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 131 and accompanying text for an explanation of the canons
of statutory construction which include the use of legislative history if the language of a
statute is ambiguous.
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proach which is necessary where the legislative history is unclear as
to congressional intent. 136 These extremes have fostered a multi
tude of intermediate theories ranging from the "soft" plain meaning
rule 137 to formalism,138 historicism139 and imaginative reconstruc
tion.140 The canons of statutory construction themselves include re
course to legislative history if the statute's language is ambiguous
and the legislative intent is clear,141 The Wheelabrator and Chicago
courts agreed that legislative history could be useful in determining
congressional intent if the legislative history is clear. However, the
Chicago and Wheelabrator courts parted company on what legisla
tive history is useful in statutory construction. The Wheelabrator
court found the legislative intent clear. The Chicago court chose
not to consider any legislative history because the court found the
legislative intent unclear. This resulted in the court's literal con
struction of the statute.
An analysis of the Supreme Court's views on the use of legisla
tive history in statutory construction suggests that the Supreme
Court supports the use of legislative history within certain defined
parameters. The Wheelabrator court's construction of the statute is
consistent with these parameters.
A.

Plain Meaning Approach

According to the Supreme Court, if the language of a statute is
clear, a court cannot replace that language with "unenacted legisla
tive intent."142 The Supreme Court has indicated that a court
136. This has been referred to as the "textualist" approach. See Recent Case,
Statutory Construction-Drafting Errors-D. C. Circuit Declares section 92 of the Na
tional Bank Act Invalid-Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke,
955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992),105 HARV. L. REV. 2116 (1992) (suggesting that scrivener
or inadvertent errors by Congress should be corrected by the judiciary even though
appearing to forego the rigid textual approach to statutory construction). Subse
quently, Independent Insurance Agents was reversed on other grounds by U.S. Nat.
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993).
137. See infra text accompanying note 156 for the definition of the soft plain
meaning rule.
138. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of the for
malist attitude toward use of legislative history in statutory construction.
139. See infra text accompanying note 150 for an explanation of the historicist
approach to the use of legislative history in statutory construction.
140. See Eskridge, infra note 145 at 630-36.
141. See Stevens, supra note 131.
142. INS v. Cardoza-Fonsezca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has been influenced in its past two terms by Justice Scalia's strict
textual approach to statutory construction. But the Court has not relinquished the
traditional approaches, including use of legislative history where the language of a stat
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should begin statutory analysis with what the statute actually
says.143 Adhering to a statute's literal meaning lends credence to
and respect for the institutions of bicameralism and separation of
powers because it limits the judiciary to the statute's words. l44 Lit
eralism, or as more recently labeled, "textualism," also supports the
"principal rationale of congressional discipline."145 Literalism al
lows a statute to be articulated from its four corners.t 46 In addition,
literalism promotes precision and consistency while preventing un
certainty and pliability of statutory language. 147
Textualists posit that once the plain meaning of a statute has
been established, the intent of the statute should only be gleaned
from further examination of the statute itself, official authoritative
interpretations of other provisions of the statute, and canons of
statutory construction. l48 Textualists, in the three different theoret
ical frameworks of realism, historicism, and formalism, criticize the
use of legislative history in statutory construction. Realists contend
that legislative history is not representative of anyone's intent as far
as how the current issue should be decided. They further assert that
judges have no way of really knowing what Congress would do if
confronted directly with the problem facing the court. When using
legislative history, a court merely guesses what Congress would do
if it were solving the instant issue. 149
Historicists criticize the use of legislative history in statutory
construction because they argue that it is impossible to recreate a
past event and discern another's intent at the exact moment of the
past event. Current interpretation of past events is always clouded
by current social attitudes and contemporaneous views of the facts,
the role of the judiciary, and by society's expectations at any time in
history.150
Formalists argue that use of legislative history does a disservice
ute is ambiguous. See Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory
and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L. J. 160.
143. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981).
144. See Recent Case, supra note 136, at 2116.
145. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
Professor Eskridge presents an exhaustive analysis and critique of Justice Scalia's textu
alist approach to statutory construction.
146. Id. at 643.
147. See Recent Case, supra note 136, at 2119. Uncertainty and pliability of stat
utory language have been major criticisms of the use of legislative history in statutory
construction. Id.
148. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
149. See Eskridge, supra note 145, at 643.
150. Id. at 644-45.
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to our democratic form of government. 15l Formalists see unelected
judges, without constraints, as usurping the role of lawmakers if
they can interpret language from any source and replace the text of
a statute with their own interpretation of it.152
Most recently, however, formalism embraces the less severe
position that legislative history may be invoked cautiously, yet still
avoided where possible. 153 Recent formalism is the apparent the
ory behind the Chicago court's approach to statutory construction.
Although the Supreme Court has moved toward a textualist
position in recent years, it has never suggested that there is no place
for legislative history in statutory construction.154 The Court has
repeatedly exhibited a tendency to adhere to the traditional "soft"
plain meaning rule. 155 The "soft" plain meaning rule allows the use
of legislative history as the best evidence of the purpose of the stat
ute where the statutory language is ambiguous or in direct conflict
with the intentions of the drafters. 156 The "soft" plain meaning rule
has been manipulated by many courts so that virtually any docu
ment which explains, refers to or is impliedly relevant to the statute
at issue can be used to construe the statute and to determine con
gressional intent.157
The Supreme Court has recognized that statutory construction
problems arise for a court when a statute cannot be construed liter
ally due to its ambiguous language. The Supreme Court has also
identified typical solutions to basic statutory construction problems.
First, if the literal interpretation of the statute results in a direct
conflict with clear congressional intent, the court would be over
reaching to not consider legislative history.1 58 Second, where literal
interpretation of the statute produces "absurd results," judges must
find a rational construction of the statute using, among other things,
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 656.
154. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1986) (stating the Court's
disregard of agency interpretation where conflicting); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (explaining that if literal construction of a statute would be at
odds with the intentions of the drafters, the drafters' intentions are controlling); Con
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
155. See Eskridge, supra note 145, at 626·30.
156. Id. at 626.
157. See supra note 154.
158. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (explaining
that if literal construction of a statute would be at odds with the intentions of the draft
ers, the drafters' intentions are controlling). See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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the statute's legislative history.159 Third, if the language of a statute
is ambiguous, it cannot be interpreted literally. Therefore, courts
must look to legislative history in an attempt to clear up the ambi
guity.160 Although myriad legislative materials are referred to by
courts as legislative history, the Supreme Court has recognized that
most should be afforded little weight in statutory construction. 161
Supreme Court cases suggest a hierarchy of legislative history au
thority to be used in statutory construction. 162
B.

Most Authoritative Legislative History

The Supreme Court has recognized the most authoritative
source of congressional intent to be committee reports. 163 Commit
tee reports allow clear insight into the intent of those who drafted
the statute's language. Conference committee reports are even
more probative of the intent of both the Senate and the House on a
particular bill. The conference committee knows virtually every
thing there is to know about the bill before it is voted on and rec
ommended to Congress or killed in committee. l64 The court may
also give significant weight to rejected proposals for legislation if
the rejection occurred in committee before enactment of the subse
quently accepted version of the statute. The Court has found re
jected language of an earlier proposal evidence of what Congress
discarded as possible statutory language. 165
Sponsor statements are also given substantial weight by the
Supreme Court in referring to legislative intent when construing a
statute. Sponsors are more likely than any other congressional
member to know the legislation's details. 166 Where a sponsor state
159. See Stevens, supra note 131, at 1383.
160. [d.
161. See infra notes 162-86 and accompanying text.
162. See Eskridge supra note 145 at 642-46 for a thorough discussion of a pro
posed hierarchy of legislative authority and explanation of the proposed weight af
forded to each.
163. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
43-44 n.7 (1986) (stating committee reports are the "authoritative source for legislative
intent"); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (stating the most authoritative
source for finding the legislature's intent lies in the committee reports on the bill).
164. See Eskridge, supra note 145, at 621; Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
122-25 (1987); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974); S & E
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972).
165. Tanner, 343 U.S. at 122-25.
166. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 716 (1989) (Civil
Rights Act of 1966, Sen. Trumbull and Rep. Wilson); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S.
326, 333-34 (1988) (Speedy Trial Act, Rep. Cohen).
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ment is ambiguous, the Court also has expressed a willingness to
look at floor and hearing colloquy.167
C.

Least Authoritative Legislative History

Although a major tenet of the textualist rationale is to give
substantial deference to administrative agency interpretation,168 in
a number of cases the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that
conflicting administrative agency interpretations of a statute169 and
subsequent legislative history interpreting the statute should be af
forded little, if any, weight in statutory construction. 17D In fact, the
Court has stated that "where the question is one of specific applica
tion of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing
court's function is limited."I71 However, where an agency position
on an issue is equivocal, the courts of appeals have been divided
with respect to the deference owed to the agency interpretation. l72
167. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 553-54 (1987) (refus
ing to rely on an ambiguous sponsor statement when statutory definitions and state
ments of other legislators differed).
168. See Russell L. Weaver, Evaluating Regulation Interpretations: Individual
Statements, 80 Ky. L. J. 987 (1991-92) for a background discussion of deference princi
ples; see also Stever, infra note 172.
169. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1986) and cases cited
therein (rejecting agency interpretation where there is "inconsistency of the positions
the [EPA] has take.n through the years.").
170. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725
F. Supp. 758, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting from Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,117 (1980) ("the views of a subsequent Congress form
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one" (citation omitted».
171. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
172. See Donald W. Stever, Jr., Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal
Environmental, Health and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application
of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 35 (1983) for an in depth analysis of deference to
agency interpretation of statutes. Professor Stever contrasted two cases in which the
courts were faced with an inconsistent EPA position on the meaning of a statute. Id. at
62-67. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the EPA
refused to place hydroelectric dams under the permit requirement of the Clean Water
Act even though it was argued that dams, by changing the physical and chemical
properties of the stream water, harmed wildlife in similar ways as pollutants. Because
the EPA had sharply disagreed internally on the issue, the district court interpreted the
statute itself, ascertained congressional intent and ordered the dams brought within the
permit requirement. [d. The court of appeals reversed, stating that if the issue is one of
policy implications, great deference should be afforded the agency position. Id. at 169.
In a second case, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d
718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), an EPA regulation was challenged based on the EPA's
interpretation of the term "stationary source" as it appeared in Part D of the 1977
amendments to the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C.
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The Supreme Court has set out guidelines regarding the
amount of deference which should be given to an agency interpreta
tion of a statute. If an agency interpretation of a statute is to be
afforded weight in statutory construction, the interpretation must
be "rational and consistent with the statute."173 The Supreme
Court will consider several factors in determining what is "rational
and consistent with the statute."174 First, the Court will ask
whether Congress addressed the issue. If it did, the Court may ac
cede to Congress if Congress used explicit language which became
the agency regulation. 175 If not, the Court will consider whether the
agency resolved the issue. If the agency resolved the issue, the
Court must give deference to the agency interpretation if the
agency interpretation is a rational and consistent construction of
the statuteP6 Finally, the Court will consider whether Congress
expressly authorized the agency to promulgate the regulation that is
the subject of the interpretation. If such power was authorized, the
agency interpretation may be controlling unless it is arbitrary, capri
cious, or directly contradicts the statuteP7
In addition, the Court has indicated that a post enactment pro
nouncement of the entire legislature may be afforded significant
weight in statutory construction. 178 In contrast, little weight should
be afforded to subsequent remarks, pronouncements, or reports of
§§ 7470-7479 (1988), which imposes more stringent controls under the "stationary
source" term than Part D of the Act and which initially gave rise to the controversy in
the case. Although Part D of the Act did not define the term, the EPA defined it for
Part D purposes. The Part D definition created a conflict with the term "major emitting
facility" which appeared to be an identical concept, that is, defining the "thing that is to
be regulated." See Stever at 66, n.I71. However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
had previously decided that the two terms were not identical and a dual definition of a
term for Part C and D purposes would constitute "an exercise of statutory interpreta
tion" on the EPA's part. The EPA later amended its position and made the two defini
tions identical by regulation. When the court in Natural Resources Defense Council was
faced with this inconsistent EPA position, the court gave no deference to the agency at
all. Natural Resources, 685 F.2d at 726. Professor Stever concluded that the court's
inconsistent application of deference to the agency is due to the lack of criteria for
according deference. Stever, at 67.
173. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 123 (1987).
174. Id.
175. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
176. Id. at 843.
177. Id. at 843-44.
178. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 840, 847 (1991); see infra note 180
and accompanying text.

174

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:149

individuals or groupS.179 For example, where Congress has passed a
statute to explain an earlier statute, the post-enacted statute can be
given significant weight in construing the earlier law. 180 Con
versely, a single senator or representative's opinion of what statu
tory language means, spoken or written after the passage of the
statute, should be given little or no weight in construing the
statute. 181
Furthermore, the Court has considered a post-enactment pro
nouncement of a legislative committee with respect to previously
enacted legislation to be significant. . If the committee pro
nouncement was made within five years of the enacted legislation
and the committee is the very one which reported the bill that be
came the law, significant weight may be afforded to the committee
pronouncement. 182
The Supreme Court affords little, if any weight, to post-enact
ment pronouncements of individual legislators in statutory con
struction. Such pronouncements include opinions of legislators,
even in floor debate on proposed legislation following an enact
ment,183 or interpretations of a group of legislators attempting to
promote later legislation. l84 The Court has even held that a sena
tor's subsequent correction of his own error during floor debate is
179. Gozlon-Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 847; see infra note 180 and cases cited therein.
180. See Gozlon-Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 847 (stating that the view of a later Con
gress, while not definitive of intent of an earlier enactment, has persuasive value); see
also, Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp., v. Shell
Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 576 (1980) (stating that views of a subsequent Congress cannot
override the enacting legislature but are entitled to significant weight if the enacting
legislature is obscure).
181. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
182. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942). In Sioux
Tribe, the issue was whether the General Allotment Act of 1887, by including Indian
reservations that had been authorized by executive order, gives Indians located on them
the same right of title as the Indians on reservations authorized by statute or treaty.
The Court relied on an 1892 report of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. The
report, in addressing whether to abolish a certain Indian reservation, stated that Indian
reservation residents, under executive order, did not enjoy the same title rights. The
Supreme Court found the committee statement "virtually conclusive as to the signifi
cance of the act." Id. at 329-30; see also Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980)
(giving significant weight to a directive issued one year later from the Senate Commit
tee that the Secretary of the Interior should proceed on the patentability of the shale oil
issue under the savings clause which was the intent of the previous legislation).
183. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
184. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962) (concluding that the interpre
tation of a previous statute by a group of congressmen seeking to promote later legisla
tion should be given no weight in construing the earlier statute).
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afforded no weight in statutory construction. 18S
These developed parameters of the Court allow lower courts to
gauge their use of legislative history when construing a statute to
determine congressional intent. Based on these parameters, the
Supreme Court has moved toward the conclusion that, as the
Wheelabrator court put it, subsequent legislative history forms a
"hazardous basis for inferring intent."186
D. Application of Supreme Court Views to the Wheelabrator
and City of Chicago Cases
Both the Second Circuit in Wheelabrator and the Seventh Cir
cuit in Chicago agreed that the statutory language of section 3001(i)
is ambiguous. Both courts also agreed that legislative history is use
ful in statutory construction where the language of the statute is
ambiguous and the legislative history is clear.187 The courts dis
agreed, however, as to what legislative history to consider in deter
mining whether the legislative history of section 3001(i) is clear.
The Wheelabrator court relied primarily on the Senate Report
accompanying section 3001(i). The court further relied on the
EPA's pre-enactment interpretation of its own household waste ex
clusion.1 88 As a result of this reliance, the court concluded that bot
tom ash was intended to be exempt from Subtitle C regulation. The
court disregarded, as irrelevant and non-authoritative, the post-en
actment EPA interpretations of the statute,189 individual legislators'
post-legislation interpretations,l90 and post-enactment proposed
legislation language,191 in deciding that ash was exempt from haz
ardous waste regulation.
The Chicago court found at first blush that the Senate Report
indicated that "generation" of ash was included in the original ex
emption. l92 However, after considering the Senate Report, all of
185. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (noting such a "belated
correction is not probative").
186. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725
F. Supp. 758,770 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980) (stating that statements by an individuallegisla
tor in subsequent hearings and subsequent committee report were not entitled to much
weight)), affd, 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991).
187. Id. at 765-66; see supra notes 84-97.
188. See supra note 58.
189. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. 766-69; see supra notes 58-63.
190. See supra note 113.
191. See Hearings, supra note 60.
192. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text for the Seventh Circuit's
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the conflicting EPA interpretations (both authoritative and non-au
thoritative), post-enactment interpretations, and proposed legisla
tion language, the Seventh Circuit was l.eft confused as to legislative
intent. 193 As a result, the court was forced to rely on a textual con
struction of the statute. In so doing, the Chicago court found the
term "management" dispositive because the term "generation" was
not used in the actual language of the statute. The court inter
preted "management" from a policy standpoint. 194 The court found
that the exemption's purpose is to "manage" household wastes and
that a stated purpose of RCRA is to encourage the careful manage
ment of hazardous wastes that are dangerous to human health. 195
The court then concluded that Congress could not have meant the
"generation"of hundreds of tons of hazardous ash, dangerous to
human health, to be included within the exemption.
The Seventh Circuit should not have considered all of section
3001(i)'s legislative history and would not have been left confused if
it had considered the Supreme Court's rules of statutory construc
tion. The Supreme Court has indicated that pre-enactment inter
pretations or explanations of statutory language are most
authoritative in construing a statute. The court need not have re
jected all legislative history on the matter and would not have been
confused by what appeared to be a "waffling" legislative history if
the court had considered only the Senate Report and the pre-enact
ment interpretation of the bill. 196 These two authoritative sources
for use in construing section 3001(i) should have clarified the ex
emption's language for the court. The Seventh Circuit's approach
did not comport with the Supreme Court's parameters for statutory
construction because the Seventh Circuit did not disregard non-au
analysis of the terms "generation," which is not specifically used in section 3001(i), and
"management. "
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 16 and 134 for some discussion of policy considerations that
are inherent in all hazardous waste issues. This Note does not address the policy argu
ments that could be made on either side of the issue. Rather, this Note focuses on the
Second and Seventh Circuits' methods of statutory construction and whether the courts
adhered to the Supreme Court's parameters for using legislative history in statutory
construction. See Sale, supra note 24, at 437-39, for further discussion of the interpreta
tion of § 3001(i) regarding the use of the terms "managment" and "generation" as pre
and post-Combustion regulation terms. The author concludes that § 3001(i) must apply
both pre- and post-Combustion processes so that the language of § 3001(i) has meaning
and so that municipal incineration is encouraged. Id.
195. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
196. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 345, 350 (7th
Cir.1991). See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text for the textual analysis of the
court.
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thoritative legislative history. The Seventh Circuit's consideration
of conflicting EPA positions on the issue, post-enactment legisla
tors' interpretations and post-enactment proposed legislation was in
conflict with the Supreme Court guidelines which categorize these
pieces of legislative history as the least authoritative in statutory
construction. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that EPA
interpretations which are inconsistent should be given little or no
weight. 197 Likewise, post-enactment pronouncements of intent, un
less issued by the entire Congress, are of little weight in construing
a statute. 198 This discounts the Seventh Circuit's consideration of
the senators' and Representative Florio's letters which the court
partially relied on in finding that the legislative history of section
3001(i) was unclear. 199 If the Supreme Court's legislative history
guidelines were used appropriately, the Second and Seventh Cir
cuits could have arrived at a consistent and predictable result, even
in this circumstance of muddled statutory intent.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that committee reports,
such as the Senate Committee Report on section 3001(i), are to be
given significant weight as the most authoritative legislative history
for use in statutory construction. 2OO Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held that post-enactment pronouncements and interpre
tations of legislation are to be afforded little, if any, weight in statu
tory construction. 201 The Wheelabrator court found that post
enactment EPA interpretations of the statute,z02 individual legisla
tor's letters203 and post-enactment proposed legislation that had
failed,z04 all which indicated that ash should not be exempt from
regulation as a hazardous waste, were irrelevant and non-authorita
197. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 768-69; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 n.30 (1986). It could be argued that the EPA is the only vehicle with which
Congress can specify exact requirements of its overall legislation, in the name of effi
ciency and expediency, in passing any complex environmental law which will constantly
need refining and redefining of its major policy provisions.
198. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) (stating the views of some
members of Congress "as to the construction of a statute adopted years before by an
other Congress have very little, if any significance"); United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (refusing to give any weight to individual legislator's pro
nouncements in 1947 concerning the meaning of a statute passed in 1932). The Court
pointed out, however, that more weight could be given if a legislator had been a mem
ber of the very committee that had recommended passage of the bill. [d.
199. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 348. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 180-85.
202. See supra notes 58-63.
203. See supra note 113.
204. See supra note 64.
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tive for purposes of statutory construction due to the "post-enact
ment" timing of those pieces of legislative history.205 The Second
Circuit's reasoning comports closely with the Supreme Court pa
rameters for use of legislative history in statutory construction.206
Consequently, the Second Circuit's conclusion that ash was in
tended to be exempted from regulation as a hazardous waste by
section 3001(i) is quite compelling.
First, the Wheelabrator court utilized the canons of statutory
construction reasonably in its analysis. 207 In order to give full effect
to the statute's purpose, the Wheelabrator court recognized that
RCRA is an "entire scheme of legislation."208 The court reconciled
the three purposes of RCRA to regulate and manage both hazard
ous and non-hazardous solid wastes while protecting human health
and promoting conservation through energy recovery.209 The court
realized that regulating ash as a hazardous waste would, in effect,
emasculate municipalities' attempts to promote incineration which
is regarded by Congress as an important step in achieving conserva
tion through energy recovery.2l0
The Wheelabrator court also reasonably construed RCRA as a
whole. 2ll The court acknowledged that proper deference is given
to an EPA regulation when that regulation is internally consistent
with the scheme of RCRA as a whole. Such was not the case in
Wheelabrator, however, because the EPA interpretations were in
consistent. Although RCRA mandates regulation and although the
regulations are express directives, the purpose of the regulations is
to make the legislation clear and operative.212 The court found that
shifts in the EPA position between 1980 and 1987 regarding the ex
clusion of bottom ash from hazardous waste regulation could not
allow RCRA to operate effectively.213 Therefore, the court inter
preted the statute in light of the Supreme Court parameter afford
ing less agency deference when there are conflicts with a previous
205. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 769-70.
206. See supra notes 131-86 and accompanying text.
207. See Stevens, supra note 131, for a description of the basic canons of statutory
construction.
208. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 767; 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988); see supra note 1
and accompanying text.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988).
210. Wheelabrator,725 F. Supp. at 768.
211. See Stevens, supra note 131.
212. See supra notes 168-77 for the Supreme Court parameters for using agency
interpretations of its own regulations in statutory construction.
213. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 767; see supra notes 56-63.
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interpretation, if the court chooses to consider it at all. 214 The Sec
ond Circuit chose to consider only the EPA's pre-enactment inter
pretation in the bill's Preamble, as the EPA interpretation of the
language in the bill.215 This consideration of the Preamble com
ported with the Supreme Court parameter that pre-legislative pre
ambles and reports are among the most authoritative for purposes
of using legislative history in statutory construction.216 The Pream
ble of section 3001(i) accompanied the Senate Report into Con
gress before it voted on the bill. The Wheelabrator court concluded
that Congress intended the Preamble interpretation to be the intent
of the statutory language as passed. 217 Because it disregarded non
authoritative legislative history, and considered the most authorita
tive history, the Wheelabrator court seems to have arrived at the
more compelling conclusion.
In using Supreme Court parameters for use of legislative his
tory to determine the congressional intent of section 3001(i), only
pre-legislative agency interpretation and the Senate Report accom
panying the exemption should have been afforded weight. 218 The
Senate Report and the pre-legislative agency interpretation both in
dicated that municipal bottom ash is part of the "household waste"
stream and therefore excluded from regulation as a hazardous
waste under section 3001(i).219 From an analysis of Supreme Court
directives and consideration of appropriate legislative history, it ap
pears quite clear that ash falls within section 3001(i) and should be
excluded from regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA.
CONCLUSION

The Wheelabrator court chose to sift through all of the avail
able legislative history and to extract that which should have been
214. See Stever, supra note 172 and accompanying text.
215. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 766-69. See supra notes 84-90 and accompany
ing text.
216. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 770; see also supra note 163.
217. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764; see also supra notes 90-92 and accompa
nying text. Common sense allows the inference that Congress' inadvertence or even
outright mistakes have resulted, on occasion, in less than crystal clear legislation. In
thjs case, the term "generation" is expressly included in the Senate Report accompany
ing the 1984 household waste exclusion clarification. It is reasonable to infer that what
the EPA said to clarify the previous ambiguity in the statute language was what Con
gress intended, although inadvertently Congress did not change the terms "manage
ment" and "generation." Rather, as the Wheelabrator court put it, they are
"coterminous." Id.
218. See supra notes 162-166.
219. See supra notes 162-166.
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afforded weight in construing section 3001(i). The court then ig
nored the irrelevant history and gave the authoritative history
proper weight in construing congressional intent.
Applying settled principles of what is appropriate and authori
tative legislative history for consideration in statutory construction
allows the courts to sift through the irrelevant and focus on the rele
vant authority. The Wheelabrator court ably coordinated the legis
lative and judicial branch functions of making the law and
interpreting it by affording proper weight to authoritative legisla
tive history in construing RCRA's section 3001(i) "Household
Waste" exemption to exempt municipal ash from hazardous waste
regulation. Until Congress can be regarded as infallible, it will
make errors in language and it will create ambiguous terms in legis
lation. The use of legislative history to discern true congressional
intent is better than the educated guesses of the courts. Only Con
gress, through additional legislation, can change the scope of the
language of a statute to reflect a new or different intent. The
Supreme Court has provided guidelines for the use of legislative
history in statutory construction which the courts should use. It is
Congress' task to notice an unintended judicial construction of a
statute and to rectify congressional error or ambiguity with legisla
tive action.
Jane Ellen Warner

